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The Western Balkans and the Islamic schisms 
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Vladimir Ajzenhamer
Introduction
Religious divisions are an important part of the historical heritage of the Is-
lamic world, which is still, to a large extent, heavy burden of mutual relations 
between “countries of Prophet Muhammad”. These divisions determine not 
only the nature of relations between Islamic countries, and the rules of the for-
eign affairs “game” in the Islamic world but they also determine their internal 
political turmoil. The “Earthquake” of the Arab Spring which has been shak-
ing the Middle East for two years now is the latest example of how divisions 
among Muslims create not only reality but also future of this region. Without 
understanding the Islamic schism it is impossible to understand the uprising 
against Assad in Syria or answer as to why Arab countries such as Qatar, UAE 
and Saudi Arabia support the rebels in that country and yet at the same time 
violently suppress the revolution in Bahrain. Without understanding these is-
sues it would be impossible to understand the complex relationship between 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, two Middle Eastern states which both claim the right to 
be considered as the guardians of the “true” Islam. Through the lens of Middle 
Eastern version of the “Cold War”, an expression which can most suitably de-
scribe the relationship between these two countries in the past few decades, 
best reflects the depth and significance of the religious divisions in Islamic 
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world,1 and above all, the importance of Sunni-Shia divisions. However, it is 
important to emphasize that the Sunni-Shia division and the diverse conse-
quences which this rift carries is something which is primarily related to the 
Middle East. This region represents both the cradle of the Islamic faith and 
the root of its division. On the other hand, the Balkan Muslims as authentic 
and “autochthonous” European Muslim populations have, until recently, nev-
er faced this kind of division. After the Ottoman conquest of this part of Eu-
rope a significant number of Christians converted to Islam. One part of the lo-
cal Slavic population embraced the new Islamic religion and life in this region 
was getting, slowly but surely, a completely new and different physiognomy, 
marked by the spirit of the Sunni Islam. Due to centuries of stability in the Ot-
toman Empire and to the lack of religious reform movements in this part of 
the “Islamic” world, the Balkan Muslims remain primarily aware of the Sunni 
Islamic teaching and practice. The other interpretation of Islam remained re-
mote and exotic to them.
But before we deal with the problem of Balkan Muslims encounter with 
the Sunni-Shia division it is necessary to first illuminate key features of the 
oldest divisions between the followers of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Islamic schism - the basic facts
The divisions in the Muslim community began shortly after the death of 
Muhammad in the early period of the caliphate. During his lifetime Muham-
mad did not appoint his successor and after his death Muslims were forced to 
choose a new leader among them by consensus. Since it was broadly accept-
ed that Muhammad can not be inherited as the prophet of God, the ques-
tion of succession came down to the question of further management over 
the Muslim community.2 The first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and Omar, enjoyed 
1 Frequent public concerns made by Saudi Arabia on the rise of Iranian influence in the Mid-
dle East strongly support this remark. At the donor conference for the reconstruction of 
Gaza, held in early March 2009, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince 
Saud al’Faisal called for Arab unity in suppressing the growing Iranian influence in the re-
gion. Saudi calls for anti-Iranian and anti-Shiite mobilization in particular gained strength in 
particular after the start of the current „Arab Spring”, when Gulf Arab monarchies faced the 
danger of a stronger Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon (Hezbollah) Shia axis.
2 Muslims believe that Muhammad was the last in a series of prophets. Therefore the revela-
tion that he brought (the Quran) is also God’s last and final revelation. 
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major support  among the faithful, but the selection of Uthman ibn Affan to 
the position of the third caliph became very controversial.3 Turning a large 
number of Muslims against him, Uthman ibn Affan ended up as the victim 
of a plot which was a prelude to the bloody civil war which would sow the 
seeds of discord that would soon permanently divide the Islamic communi-
ty into three major branches of this religion - Sunnis, Shiites and Kharijites.
Even during the election of Abu Bakr for the first Caliph there was a large 
number of faithful who believed that the title of successor must remain within 
the Muhammad’s family. Given that Muhammad did not leave male descendants 
this group of believers gathered around Mohammed’s nephew and son in law 
Ali ibn Abi Talib. They believed that he had the right to Mohammed’s spiritual 
and secular heritage. Ali was forced to accept the appointments of the first two 
caliphs but when he was bypassed for the third time his party Shi’atu Ali began 
to confront the newly elected caliph more openly. Uthman’s rule led to a gener-
al dissatisfaction which culminated in an open rebellion. The rebellion erupted 
in Medina in 656 and the caliph was killed in the urban riots. After his death, 
the Muslim community started to slide into anarchy. Ali and Uthman’s cousin 
Muawiyah stepped forward as two most powerful pretenders for the title of the 
new caliph.  Ali’s followers in Medina proclaimed him as the new caliph, but 
Muawiyah’s supporters did not accept this choice and war among these frac-
tions became inevitable. Ali came out as “virtual” winner from this conflict. He 
became the fourth caliph but he gambled away the chance to completely defeat 
his main rival Muawiyah. Eager to avoid bloodshed among Muslims, Ali agreed 
to negotiate. Although, he was eventually recognized as Caliph during these ne-
gotiations, the decision to negotiate was fatal for him for several reasons. First, 
because of this decision he lost part of his followers, who will form a separate 
party since then known as Kharijites. Second, Muawiyah proved to be a more 
skilled politician than Ali and by skillful fraud and intrigue he would soon sig-
nificantly weaken the political influence of newly elected caliph and once again 
start to threaten him militarily. However, Ali will remain caliph until the end of 
3 The controversy was most likely caused by the fact that Uthman ibn Affan was from a fam-
ily of Umayyads, whose members initially opposed Muhammad’s preaching of the Allah’s 
truth. However, there are also different opinions on this subject. Some authors argue that 
dissatisfaction was provoked by much more practical reasons, primarily corruption, nepo-
tism and greed of the third caliph. For more see text Fred M. Donner, „Muhammad and the 
Caliphate,” in Oxford History of Islam (edited by John L. Esposito), Clio, Belgrade, 2002.
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his life. He was assassinated, not by his bitter opponent Muawiyah but by the 
hand of his former supporters. He fell as a victim of Kharijit revenge, who ac-
cused him of being too merciful towards Muawiyah and his followers. After Ali’s 
death Muawiyah will take power and establish Umaayad caliphate in Damascus. 
This led to the first and most important division in the history of Islam. Muawi-
yah’s followers would form the nucleus of the Sunni Islam which the majority of 
Muslims in the world profess. Professor Darko Tanasković described their doc-
trine as follows: “According to the initial Sunni stance, for caliph to be elected 
or appointed, he must originate from the tribe of Quraish4 and his subjects owe 
him unconditional obedience even when he is wrong.”5 Ali’s followers would 
form another important branch of Islam-Shi’ism or Shia Islam and they have re-
mained attached to their belief that Muhammad’s blood must run through the 
veins of Islamic rulers. For their rulers they would choose only the direct de-
scendants of Muhammad.
The conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, the fight that started in the “ear-
ly childhood” of this great faith, remains to this day one of the main sources 
of instability in Islam. If we analyze the main characteristics of this schism,  it 
can be noted that in its nature this was primarily a political division. In sim-
ple terms, it was a struggle for the succession of Mohammed which can be 
clearly characterized as a struggle for power. However, another dimension of 
this schism is very important - a dimension of genealogy. Muslim rulers al-
ways tried to trace their origins to either Quraish bloodline (Sunni) or with 
the direct descendants of Muhammad (Shiites). 
Theological context of this schism will appear later on, through further 
development of the Islamic thought. With the further development of Shi-
ism, the division would be deepened with significant theological differenc-
es,  primarily with the learning of the mystical meaning of the Qur’an in 
which Ali was initiated by the prophet Muhammad. Also, the belief in divine 
providence behind the words and actions of Shiite Imams inherited through 
the bloodline,6 emerged over time as one of the main specifics of Shia Islam.
After the first schism, the Islamic community continued to split on the 
multitude of sects, religious schools and movements. As Tanasković noted 
4 Tribe of  the Prophet Muhammad.
5 Darko Tanasković, Islam - dogma i život, Srpska književna zadruga, Belgrade, 2008,  p. 162.
6 This doctrine is known as Ma’sum, which indicates infallibility of the Imam, who is inspired by Allah.
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“...singular tree of faith branched in a wide treetop.”7 Analyzing the reasons 
and motives for further divisions in Islam, Oliver Potežica concludes that 
these schisms were caused primarily by: theological disagreements, differ-
ences in religious and legal doctrines, different attitude towards mysticism 
in Islam, and demands for restoration of the “original” or “ fundamental” Is-
lamic teachings.8 For our topic,  two lines of this latter division are relevant: 
theological and reform-fundamentalist one.9 Wahhabism, the official “ver-
sion” of Islam in Saudi Arabia, is a religious movement that emerged exactly 
on these lines of division.
Wahhabism is often described as a both radical fundamentalist and tra-
ditionalistic reform movement within Sunni Islam. This movement was 
founded by Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab in the 18th century. It 
is important to emphasize that this is one of the first reform movement in 
the Islamic world. Significant contribution was given to the birth of Wah-
habism by dissatisfaction with theological innovation, revision of faith and 
other deviations of the mainstream Sunni Islam. Even today this movement 
actively aims to “return” the Muslims to the “path” of Salaf al Salih - pious 
predecessors from the first three generations of Muslims. Therefore, there 
are some opinions which exclude Wahhabism from the scope of Sunni Is-
lam. Such position is reinforced by the fact that the Wahabi does not recog-
nize the authority of any of the four Sunni madhhabs (legal-religious Islamic 
schools). They also prohibit many of the religious traditions that are prac-
ticed throughout the Sunni Islamic world.
Islamic “re-conquest” of the Balkans
For centuries, the Western Balkans Muslims tied their religious identity 
to the Ottoman Empire and for Hanafi school of Islam, which was the dom-
inant interpretation of Islamic religious teaching on the European territo-
ry of the Ottoman Empire. With the war that followed the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the other interpretations of Islamic teachings found their way 
7 Darko Tanasković, Islam - dogma i život, Srpska književna zadruga, Belgrade, 2008. p.160.
8 Oliver Potežica, Vehabije između istine i predrasude, „Filip Višnjić“, Belgrade, 2007.
9 It should be stressed that these two lines of division are deeply intertwined, and that it is im-
possible to make a strict distinction between them.
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to this region. The situation that emerged in Bosnia during and after war in 
1992-95 greatly increased and opened up new political, religious and securi-
ty challenges for the Western Balkans region. One of the major challenges is 
the increased influence of the leading Islamic, Middle Eastern states on the 
Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on the total Muslim pop-
ulation in the region, particularly the Muslims in the territory of the Repub-
lic of Serbia (Sandžak, Kosovo). But it should be emphasized that the same 
phenomenon can be noticed in Macedonia and Albania.
Three Muslim states in particular are interested in the Muslim question 
in this region: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. Since the end of the 80’s these 
countries have shown continued interest in the Balkans. With the war events 
that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, begins the arrival of the Muslim 
jihadists from the Middle Eastern countries, which came to help their Bos-
nian “brothers” in war with Christians (Serbs and Croats). As John L. Esposito 
noted, they came inspired by the new global jihadist sentiment that was con-
ceived on the Afghan battlefield. Sense of solidarity and global jihad sentiment 
was born among Arab-Afghans fighters (Arabs and other Muslims who had 
fought in Afghanistan during the Russian occupation) which”...subsequently 
brought Muslims from various parts of the world to participate in jihads in 
Bosnia, Kosovo...”10 Evan F. Kohlmann gives the following description of the 
true nature of this solidarity: “It would not be long before a much more seri-
ous effort was made by distant Islamic extremists to aid the suffering Bosnian 
Muslims. These young men, galvanized by hateful religious and political ide-
ologies, were determined to turn the global tide against the ‘infidel’ regimes, 
even those outside the traditional boundaries of the Middle East.”11 
This way the Saudi and Iranian interpretations of Islamic teachings found 
their way to the Balkans region, which had a significant impact on the change 
in religious consciousness and understanding of Islam among the local Mus-
lim population. Under the mask of Islamic solidarity and through political, 
military and humanitarian aid, Salafi teachings, as well as the Shia interpre-
tation of Islam arrived to this region from the Muslim states of the Middle 
10 John L. Esposito, Unholy war -Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press, 2002., p.116.
11 Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe-The Afghan-Bosnian Network, Berg, Oxford, 
2004., p.16.
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East. In this way the traditional Ottoman Islamic heritage ceased to be the 
only form of practicing Islam and space was opened for different Islamic reli-
gious teachings that originated from Middle Eastern countries. 
States such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have thus achieved  considerable re-
ligious and political influence over the Balkan Muslims, thereby becoming, 
besides Turkey (which has a traditional presence and influence among the 
Muslims of this region) another “external” factor of their internal religious 
and political relations.
Bosnian “public debate”
The issue of emerging division among Bosnian Muslims opened mani-
festly in 2006 with a provocative text about Wahhabism published in Bos-
nian daily newspaper “Oslobođenje” (“Liberation”). Author of this text 
was Professor Rešid Hafizović, who is among the most respected and most 
prominent contemporary Bosnian intellectuals. As Professor of the Faculty 
of Islamic Studies and a great expert in the field of Islamic philosophy and Is-
lamic mysticism, he is very present in the social and public life of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. His comments on current social, religious and political issues 
are often used by the media in this country. Hafizović shocked Bosnian pub-
lic for the first time in 1996 when he gave an interview to the Bosnian mag-
azine “Dani” (“Days”) in which he sharply criticized  the policy of former 
Saudi King Fahd. Interview provoked the strong response of the leadership 
of the Islamic community in the form of statement of Riyasat,12 which stood 
to protect the “proven Bosniak friends and benefactor” King Fahd. Hafizović 
was by then among the intellectuals in Bosnia who were dissatisfied with the 
politics of the Riyasat (notably a number of professors from The University 
of Sarajevo)  became known as one of the fiercest opponents of “wahhabisa-
tion” of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This reputation Hafizović will confirm ten years later, when he wrote 
his article “They’re coming for our children” published in the daily news-
paper “Liberation”.13 In this article Hafizović attacks without hesitation not 
12 Highest Islamic religious and administrative body of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
13 Rešid Hafizović, „Oni dolaze po našu decu”, Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, 25th November, 2006.
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only the Wahhabi community in Bosnia, but the very validity of the Wah-
habi teaching itself. He also wrote that Wahhabism is the greatest tragedy 
in the history of the Islam and the fatal virus which will soon dissolve the 
very substance of Bosnian Muslims. Those charges would again provoke 
very sharp response of the Riyasat and Bosnian Reis ul Ulema Mustafa Cerić. 
In the new statement from the Riyasat, Bosnian Islamic Community con-
demned “inappropriate qualifications of Professor Rešid Hafizović on the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was immensely helpful to our country and 
our people, when it was most difficult”14 The statement of Riyasat regarding 
the Hafizović article would then cause division in the Bosnian public and 
provoke a large debate in Bosnia about Saudi influence.  
On this occasion, in a new interview given to the magazine “Dani”, Hafizović 
talked more openly about Saudi influence on the current leadership of the Islam-
ic community. He said “...I must honestly admit that I have never imagined how 
far does the hand of the  mentioned monarch reach.  To the point where he be-
gins to prescribe our academic standards and patterns of thinking and speaking. 
So things seem to have gone much further than we thought”15 
Hafizović indicated without hesitation a problem of Wahhabism as a 
key issue for survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the problem that must be 
solved, otherwise “again a river of blood will start to flow trough Bosnia”16 
In a few places in the text, Hafizović again predicted the possibility of blood-
shed among Muslims.
The other professors from the Faculty of Islamic Studies have also take part 
in this debate. For example Esad Duraković and Adnan Silajdižić. Professor Si-
lajdžić also strongly opposed the trend of the increasing Wahhabi influence. 
He said that Wahhabis in Bosnia are not able to articulate the ways of Mus-
lim modernity. He pointed that they are not able to do that neither for them-
selves, nor for the others Muslims. Silajdžić warned of the danger of Wahha-
bis in terms of the dissolution of the essence of the traditional Bosnian Islam. 
“Wahhabism in Bosnia is installed as a distinctive religious, cultural and social 
14 Statement of Riyasat from November 26th 2006. 
    http://www.bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=19911 (accessed on December 20th 2013.)
15 Interview given to the magazine Dani, Sarajevo, 1st December, 2006.
16 Dani, Sarajevo, December 1st, 2006.
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phenomenon and as such it affects the social practice of Bosnian Muslims and 
other citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seriously divided parents and chil-
dren, spiritual leaders and imams, teachers and students etc.”17 
During this debate, public began to talk about how Wahhabists pene-
trated deep into Bosnian institutions - secular and those of the Islamic com-
munity. It became clear that the Wahhabists already operate institutionally,  
through Islamic pedagogical academies, run by people who were trained for 
their educational work at the very source of this uncompromising Islamic 
movement, at the Wahhabi universities of Mecca and Medina. The Bosnian 
public  found out that at the University of Zenica and Bihać students do not 
learn anything about Islamic philosophy or Sufism,  because the Wahhabi 
teachings marked them as deviations or “infidel” learning.
On the other side, representatives and supporters of the Wahhabi circles 
also joined the debate. Infamous Abu Hamza, one of the founders of the Wah-
habi community in Bosnia and Herzegovina responded strongly to these at-
tacks, but he also went a step further. He said that Muslims in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina did not live the authentic Islam, which was introduced only after 
“their” arrival, and that the Muslims in Bosnia live a form of a communist, re-
duced Islam!18 Pro-salafi journal Saff also joined the debate, attacking the men-
tioned professors, and opening many questions about the orthodoxy of certain 
religious practices such as the practice of Dovište which is a traditional Bosnian 
“pilgrimage site”.19 In this way, the public debate moved away from the prob-
lem of harmful impacts of Wahhabi teachings on the Bosnian Islamic Commu-
nity, to the question of orthodoxy of the Bosnian Muslim religious practices. 
The tragicomic part of this story is that this debate took place in the shad-
ow of the “Resolution on the constitutional changes and the interpretation 
of Islam” of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, written only 
few months earlier. Item II/4 of this Resolution underlines that “Riyasat be-
lieves that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are no extremist individuals or 
groups that may undermine the unity of Muslims”!20
17 Interview given to daily newspaper Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, November 11th, 2006. 
18 For more information, see the interview with Professor Silajdžić in Oslobođenje, Sarajevo, 
November 11th, 2006.
19 Traditional prayer in the open, usually on the site of former pagan temples.
20 http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=195:rezoluci-
ja-o-ustavnim-promjenama-i-tumaju-islama&catid=235&Itemid=223 (accessed on Decem-
ber 20th 2013.)
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As we saw, with their engagement in the field of anti-Wahhabi action pro-
fessors from the Faculty of Islamic Studies provoked rage of the members and 
supporters of the radical Islamic movement, and of the highest levels of the 
Bosnian Islamic Community. And in that particular moment this story be-
comes more complex. Division stopped being based simply on “black and 
white” distinction (Bosnian muslim vs. Wahhabi), because Wahhabis would 
play the Shia card and accuse Hafizović to be a Shia Islam promoter. And with 
this counterattack, the whole public debate began to slide into murky waters... 
In further verbal clashes and accusations, Professor Hafizović was marked 
as Iran’s insider in the Bosnian Islamic community. He was accused to be an 
enthusiastic missionary and agitator of Iranian Shiism. These charges will 
again revive rumors from the nineties about pro-Iranian subversive activi-
ties of his close colleague Enes Karić and Adnan Silajdžić. Yet it seemed that 
some of these rumors have ground in reality. Professor Hafizović’s involve-
ment in work of scientific research Institute “Ibn Sina”, a non-governmental 
organization which is financed by Iran, could be easily characterized as an 
“effort” on bringing Shiism closer to the Bosnian Muslims. For this purpose 
Hafizović wrote and translated a number of articles of similar topic, seeking 
to awaken interest of Bosnian public for this form of confession and practice 
of Islam.21 Although he never explicitly declared himself as supporter and ad-
vocate of political system introduced by Khomeini in Iran, he has repeat-
edly expressed open sympathy for the political organization of Islamic re-
public. However, these views could still be considered relatively benign had 
Hafizović not, according to his opponents, crossed the line of sympathy and 
entered into open invocation of spreading achievements of the Islamic rev-
olution beyond the borders of Iran in certain public events.22 It is also very 
21 In 1997 Hafizović published a book “Signs of Shiite spirituality” (published by The Bosnian 
Book, Sarajevo), and in 2001 he wrote an article “To be Shia - being a Muslim in another 
way” (in the magazine Signs of the Times, published by “Institute of Ibn Sina”). In addition, 
he wrote impressive number of books and papers devoted to great Iranian philosophers and 
thinkers.
22 At the panel which marked 19th anniversary of the death of Imam Khomeini, Hafizović said: 
„The Iranian friends should take into account that it is much harder to preserve the achieve-
ments of the revolution, and even harder to do everything you can to spread those values to 
the Muslim world. It (the Muslim world) has long been ready to remove some of its political 
regimes.” Video of this speech can be found at the following address: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0k3nHHOIJQc (accessed on December 20th 2013.)
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indicative that his fiercest attack on the Bosnian Wahhabis and on the policy 
of Saudi Arabia (his article in “Oslobođenje”), came less than a month after 
he officially became a member of the Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Teh-
ran. In October 2006 he became the second non-Iranian member in the en-
tire history of this famous academy. Also in late 2009 Hafizović went to Iran, 
where he was given the “Al Farabi” award for the best scientific research in 
the field of Islamic studies. 
If we put aside the rumors of subversive involvement of Professor and 
Academic Raešid Hafizović (rumors of him being an Iranian “agent” and 
“insider”) and if we take into consideration only the presented facts, it is 
clear that his professional and social “engagement” may be, with a consid-
erable degree of certainty, denoted as missionary activity. It is necessary to 
clearly pointed out that Hafizović and his colleagues from the Institute “Ibn 
Sina” and the Foundation “Mulla Sadra” (some of whom are Iranians by na-
tionality) do not directly promote Shiism. However, in the part of Bosnian 
public their actions were for a long time perceived as “selling Shiism under 
the mask of Sufism”. Although Sufism (a mystical form of Islam) is not un-
known to Sunni Islamic tradition, the fact is that Sufism is very compatible 
with Shiism and that it is very easy to sell Shiism under the mask of mystical 
teachings. So, the awakening of interest in Sufism among Bosniaks, can eas-
ily serve as a first step towards the awakening of interest in Shi’ism. That is 
why this activity can bee seen as preparing the ground for conversion of the 
interested ones into Shi’ism.
All these reasons made it possible for Bosnian Wahhabis to draw attention 
from themselves towards, until then, an almost imperceptible Shiite mission-
ary activity. From that moment the public debate is not only having in mind 
the Wahhabi community, but also the community of Shia converts which ac-
cording to some unofficial data today has 2500-3000 followers. Bosnian pub-
lic has focused on the activity of a wide range of institutions and associations 
which were associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Beside the men-
tioned “Ibn Sina” Institute and “Mulla Sadra” foundation, as main centers of 
Shiia missionary work were marked the Iranian Cultural Center, “Zehra” as-
sociation, and Persian-Bosnian College in Iljaš. Dr. Šukrija Ramić, professor 
at the Bosnian Islamic Pedagogical Faculty, emphasizes a number of effects of 
their actions: “We already have the Bosnian Muslims who converted to Shiite 
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Islam. According to some estimates, there are about three thousand of them 
(Shia converts). They don’t pray Friday prayers and Tarawih prayers, they 
don’t pray daily prayers with our priests,  they do not recognize Reis ul Ulema 
as their leader, they do not pay Zakat to Islamic community, but they send a 
fifth of their income to Iran to their spiritual leader.”23 
After a lot of mutual accusations, which eventually caught up media rep-
resentatives too,24 Bosnian public debate on “foreign” influences in the local 
Islamic community ended as suddenly as it began. Turkish Foreign Minis-
ter Ahmet Davutoglu, in order to promote Turkey’s new foreign policy doc-
trine, came to Sarajevo in 2009 and in front of Sarajevo’s central mosque 
delivered a speech about “big comeback” of Turkey to the Western Balkan 
region. In this way, he openly marked Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Turk-
ish sphere of influence. After that, Bosnian media became less and less in-
terested in the problem of Saudi and Iranian influence,  and all the “lights” 
were pointed (and still they are) at new “Turkish March” toward the Bal-
kans. Problem of Bosnian Muslim division was “pushed under the carpet”. 
But it’s still far from being solved. That is why the Riyaset of Islamic Commu-
nity recently established an “Institute for the Study of the tradition of Bos-
niaks” in order to determine what is, and what is not, the traditional Bosnian 
Islam. But this institution has failed to provide answers to the key questions 
so far. So the problem remains unsolved.
Conclusion
It is clear that the confessional “reconstruction” of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina is in progress and that the consequences of this process can not be ac-
curately predicted yet. We must be objective and admit that “new” or “im-
23 Interview  with Šukrija Ramić published in the magazine SAFF, Zenica, 25th October, 2008.
24 For example, at 16th Decembar 2009. Riyasat issued a statement which criticizes Duška Ju-
risić, host and editor of the TV show „Pošteno” („Honestly”), for the topic about Wahha-
bism in Bosnia. In this statement Riyasat expressed „surprise that Federal Television, as a 
public service broadcaster, took for the topic of its show a narrower doctrinal issues in the 
field of specialist discussions of Islamic experts.”
 http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5526:saopen-
je-rijaseta-u-povodu-emisije-ftv&catid=203:mina-vijesti-kat&Itemid=459 (accessed on 
December 20th 2013.)
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ported” Islamic teachings can not seriously jeopardize the primacy of Hanafi 
Islam traditional in this region. Turkish diplomatic offensive in this region 
additionally reduced chances for the success of Shiite and Wahhabi teach-
ings. But their very presence brings confusion among the Balkan Muslims. 
Bosnian public debate clearly pointed that out.
 This kind of confusion can have serious consequences. In theological 
terms unity of the Muslim community could be seriously threatened. And to 
some extent it already is. Members of the Wahhabi community have already 
shown hostility and animosity towards the religious heritage of the Bal-
kan Muslims. Their mentors from Saudi Arabia assist this intolerance by all 
means available: “Saudi aid agencies have been responsible for the destruc-
tion or reconstruction of many historic mosques, libraries, Quran schools, 
and cemeteries in Bosnia and in Kosovo because their Ottoman architecture, 
decorations, frescoes, and tombstones did not conform to Wahhabi icono-
clastic aesthetics that regard statues, tombstones, or artwork with human 
representations as idolatry and polytheism.”25 But, architecture and other 
material historical heritage is not the only Islamic legacy which is threat-
ened. Certain traditional religious practices are also “under fire”. For exam-
ple, the already mentioned Dovište - traditional prayer in the open, or the 
local Ramadan tradition of eating plums for iftar meal. No matter how ridic-
ulous it may sound, these and similar religious practices represent thorn in 
the eye of the local Wahhabis, and may in the future provoke some security 
incidents.26 And when we take into consideration the fact that among the lo-
cal Muslims we now have Shia minority too, it is not difficult to imagine that 
the traditional Islamic rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites, especially Wahha-
bi and Iranian Shiites, may also, in the near future, come to life in this region. 
Professor Ramić stresses this concern: “I’m afraid that, in Bosnia, in the near 
future, we will have conflicts of radical Bosnian Sunnis and radical Bosnian 
Shiites, in a similar way that we have them today among the Arabs in Iraq, 
and Pakistanis and Afghans in Pakistan in Afghanistan.”27
25 John L. Esposito, Unholy war -Terror in the Name of Islam, Oxford University Press, 2002., 
p.108.
26 Some incidents of this kind have already happened. For example, a bomb attack on a police 
station in Bugojno in 2010., conducted on the jubilee of five hundredth Ajvatovica, which is 
the largest Dovište site in Bosnia.
27 Interview  with Šukrija Ramić published in the magazine SAFF, Zenica, 25th October, 2008.
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Therefore, it is necessary to closely monitor further developments: the 
potential growth of Wahhabi and Shiite community in Bosnia, their mutu-
al confrontation and rivalry, and engagement of professors like Professor 
Hafizović and his colleagues (especially those from the institute “Ibn Sina” 
and the Foundation “Mulla Sadra”), as well as non-governmental organiza-
tions which are associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran or the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia.
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